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Abstract (131 words) 
This work explores and reviews the introduction of real option in the strategic 
management literature. The aim is to contribute to a better understanding of the origin 
of the real option. By distinguishing between shadow and real option, and implementing 
entrepreneurship in the traditional option valuation framework we obtain a more 
exhaustive representation of the strategic decision processes in the firm. We explain the 
creation of a real option as an entrepreneurial process, which transforms inventive ideas 
into profitable innovation. This constitutes a step toward an option based-theory of the 
firm by describing the emergence of a firm’s options and the strategic building of new 
competences for exercising these options. In addition, this approach offers a parallel 
understanding of why the real option theory is less used in practice than in theory. 
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The success of a firm depends on her capability to create and exploit new projects. 
Projects are  competitive opportunities that the firms must recognize, evaluate, and on 
which she has to be able to apply operating capabilities to take advantage of them. The 
general management responsible for the firm’s strategic direction fails frequently to 
manage the organization’s technological innovation process that creates these 
opportunities (Hayes et al. (2005)). 
To help managers in their decision-making process in uncertain environments new 
techniques and theories are developed, one of them is the real option theory. This 
conceptual decision-making framework is about to become a standard. The formal 
approach, originating from financial models, introducing future uncertainty and the 
opportunities a firm can seize is appealing for managers. However the use of this 
approach raises many questions linked to the theory of the firm and strategic 
management (Grundy (2004); Warner et al. (2006)).  
A major issue, almost ignored in this literature, is the question of the origin of the real 
option. In this work we try to explain the origin of the option and provide some 
elements for a better evaluation of the option in theory and practice. We use the 
entrepreneur as the resource recognizing and creating options. The lack of consideration 
devoted to entrepreneurship by most real option research works
1 explains why real 
option theory focuses mainly –if not exclusively–  on the valuation of existing options 
and not on their creation. The insights gained from considering real option and 
entrepreneurship are bi-directional. On the one hand entrepreneurship, in a resource 
based framework, can explain the origin of real option and contribute to a better 
evaluation of its value. On the other hand real option can explain the direction a 
decision maker gives to the development of the new capabilities and resources, as an 
entrepreneurial activity, by suggesting another use of the resources. Combining 
entrepreneurship and real option explains the heterogeneity of the firm and its resources 
collection and capabilities building. 
                                                 
1.  For a notable exception see McGrath (1999).  
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In the following work, we first give a brief presentation of what real options are and we 
highlight the important elements and variables that create and influence their values. In 
a part point we develop the notion of real option in the specific field of strategic 
management. This leads us to consider the successive developments and criticisms of an 
option chain. In this part we introduce the distinctive roles of entrepreneurs and 
managers in order to obtain a richer representation of the real option. In a third part we 
analyse the components of the option values in the light of the new notions introduced 
and in conclusion we discuss the difficulties to implement all this determinants in 
practice. 
 
1  Requisites for an Option-Based Approach of the Firm 
 
In the strategic theory of the firm the most obvious of the long-term goals is the survival 
of the firm. Survival is achieved by seizing profitable opportunities when these 
opportunities arise or are encouraged to arise. In the long run the profitability, survival 
and growth of a firm do not depend so much on the general efficiency with which it is 
able to organize the production as it does on the ability of the firm to establish one or 
more wide and relatively impregnable competence ‘bases’ from which it can adapt and 
extend its operations in an uncertain, changing, and competitive world (Teece et al. 
(1997)). In this approach the value of a firm is directly linked to the resources of the 
firm. These resources are tied together in a firm specific way, giving a firm the 
capability of achieving some tasks better than others. The heterogeneity in resources is a 
main reason why firms exhibit different profits and survival rates (Barney (1991)). As 
human resources are the repository of productive knowledge (including tacit and 
explicit knowledge) their development highly influences the modification of productive 
capabilities. Creating new knowledge, the most important task of the firm, enables the 
firm to produce new goods, create a new organization, or upgrade her efficiency. The 
learning mechanisms are at the origin of these capabilities and allow firm to grasp new 
opportunities (Prahalad and Hamel (1990). Making good use of an opportunity that 
brings value to the firm is nowadays called the real option, so holding and being able to 
exercise this real option depend fundamentally on the competences and learning activity 
of the firm.  
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An option gives the right but not the obligation to take a specific decision (invest, defer, 
alter) on an underlying asset, for a predetermined price at, or before, a certain time. For 
example, a firm can possess a production plant, and choose, depending on customer 
demand or competition, to construct a bigger capacity plant to obtain economies of scale 
(a growth option) or, on the contrary, to momentary shut down the plant (option defer 
production). The firm has the right, but not the obligation, to change her production 
capacity. This option, depending on the information at hand at the moment of exercise, 
allows the firm to catch new revenues flows or to reduce costs. 
 
The conceptual analogy between real and financial option is shown in Table 1. 
------------------------------ 
Insert Table 1 about here 
----------------------------- 
In this table are listed the five fundamental variables that enter in the option calculation. 
Two of these variables, that we use extensively in the third part of this work are (K) and 
(S). The exercise price (K) represents the amount the firm must pay when the option is 
exercised. For instance, if the firm wishes to construct a new plant, (K) would represent 
the construction costs. (S) represents the value of the constructed plant and corresponds 
to the present value of the future cash flows that the firm earns by exploiting the plant. 
Based on these variables we can calculate the cost of acquiring the real option. We 
distinguish between this cost (also known as premium) at the origin of the option and 
the value the option gets when the firm holds it a certain time. This value is important 
for calculating the optimal moment of exercise of the option. Once the option is 
exercised, the firm looses the value of the option for obtaining the underlying asset of 
the option (S) minus the cost of investment (K). It may happen that the value of the 
option is higher than the gain expected from the exercise of the option. This excess of 
value derives from the presence of uncertainty that exists between the date of evaluation 
and the expiration date of the option. The longer the time to exercise, the higher the 
difference between the good and bad situation outcomes that the option allows to seize 
as higher the option value. 
This property comes from the interplay of three conditions that shape the value of the 
option: uncertainty, flexibility and irreversibility. 
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1.1 Uncertainty 
Real option shares with financial option their main reason of existence: uncertainty. In 
the financial case, uncertainty is reduced to risk in the form of probabilities of 
appearance of good or bad outcomes. These probabilities are estimated, e.g. for a stock 
price, by the historical data of stock price. These probabilities are exogenous for the 
firm and are not influenced by her behaviour. In the case of real option uncertainty can 
take a much broader variety of forms, uncertainty about the demand for a good, 
uncertainty in the reaction of rival firms, uncertainty of the outcomes of a court 
decision… We see in the discussion in the second part of the present work, that 
uncertainty for real option can be made endogenous. 
 
1.2 Flexibility 
The second condition of existence of the real option is flexibility. Flexibility represents 
the possibility for an investor to exercise a real option (invest in a project, etc…) or to 
abandon it. It is flexibility that gives an option its asymmetric payoff. This flexibility 
adds a positive value to the project. In the case of a financial project, flexibility is 
identified as the possibility of transferring rights onto an underlying asset, as 
counterpart for a payment. In the case of a real option this flexibility has a variety of 
expressions. We can define six broad categories of real options, which correspond to six 
expressions of the flexibility as shown in Table 2. 
------------------------------ 
Insert Table 2 about here 
------------------------------ 
1.3 Irreversibility 
The last condition of existence for a real option is the irreversibility of the investment. 
A decision can be considered irreversible if it significantly reduces for a long time the 
variety of choices that would be possible in the future. In case of financial option, 
irreversibility is materialized by the payment of the premium. This premium, whatever 
the buyer decides, is definitely acquired by the seller. But the option can be sold again 
on the financial market, this makes the characteristics of irreversibility for a financial 
option relatively unconstraining.  
In the real option case the irreversibility is of capital importance. To sell the project 
again, or the rights of a project is only possible in the case of patents. The irreversibility 
is not only manifested in the financial part as a forgone financing capacity that limits the  
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investment possibilities of the firm, but also in terms of capabilities and knowledge 
accumulated that locks the firm in some specific activities. 
 
2  The Option Chain 
 
The existence and development of the real options need, as we have seen, the fulfilment 
of some conditions (uncertainty, flexibility, irreversibility). These conditions, sufficient 
in a financial approach, are only necessary in a managerial approach where the origin of 
the option, conditional to behaviour of individuals, needs to be explained. Who creates 
the real option?  
 
To answer this question we will analyse the different contributions made to the real 
option theory by the strategic management approach. The development we propose is 
related to the understanding of the label real option. Too often, the adjective “real” is 
explained by making exclusive reference to the financial theory arguing that financial 
options refer to a financial traded underlying asset. By contrast the real option refers to a 
non financial (real world) asset, e.g. a production facility or an R&D patent. This 
definition is true according to the origin of famous option calculation formulas but 
incomplete in terms of the problematic underlying non-financial assets. Carr (2002) and 
Kogut and Kulatilaka (2004) pinpointed that many firms, even aware of the existence of 
an opportunity of profit, do not possess the option to exploit the opportunity or cannot 
exercise the option correctly. This limitation arises, among others, from the lack of 
knowledge and competences needed to exploit the opportunity. Knowing that an 
opportunity exists and being able to exploit that opportunity are different things. For us 
a real option is an option that the firm is aware of and for the exploitation of which she 
has constructed the necessary resources and knowledge. So a real option is an option 
that the firm can really exercise. 
Figure 1 represents the successive developments of the real option chain in the strategic 
management literature. The following discussion and presentation of the option chain 
and the introduction of the entrepreneur / manager rely on that figure. 
------------------------------ 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
------------------------------  
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2.1 Standard option exploitation 
The area labelled c represents the initial step of the real option theory as it can be 
found in today’s major textbooks on that topic (Trigeorgis (1996)). This literature 
focuses mainly on the calculation of the value of the real option and the determination 
of the optimal timing for exercising this option.  
This short option chain is the following. The option is supposed to exist, to lay at the 
hand of the decision maker. The decision maker (always referred to as the manager in 
this literature) evaluates the option contingently to the future possible states, and 
decides to exercise it or not. The value thresholds determining the decision obtained are 
in general different from those determined by standard net present value techniques. For 
example, in the presence of a option to wait, this hurdle is much higher. An opposite 
example would be the growth option, which justifies investing in projects that have as 
stand alone a negative present value. Only future development possibilities can justify 
the investment. 
When this hurdle is hit or exceeded the option is exercised, which means that the project 
enters, for instance a phase of building and exploitation. Once the firm enters the market 
new options can arise such as expanding the size of the plant, diversifying the 
production, or in the worst case, stopping the production and shutting down the factory. 
 
2.2 Exploration of the identification of opportunities, the emergence of the shadow 
option 
This development, as noticed by academics in the strategic management field, makes 
the important assumption that the option exists and that the decision maker is informed 
of its existence. This is, obviously, not always the case. Bowman and Hurry (1993), 
struck by that implicit hypothesis, introduced the notion of shadow option, the option 
that a firm could exploit, or at least consider in her portfolio of choices if she was aware 
of it. This approach is appealing for the introduction of information systems in the firm, 
the use of consultants and technological watch agencies. The option that a firm 
possesses depending on resource and knowledge available inside the firm but that the 
decision maker ignores. 
 
Opportunities (and not yet options) come into existence when individuals have different 
beliefs in the possibilities offered by the available or potential resources to transform 
some inputs into some outputs that can be sold and raise a profit. An opportunity is a  
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favourable, momentary circumstance or situation that has been recognized after one has 
sought for it or has spontaneously appeared. Schumpeter (1934) distinguished between 
the notions of invention and of innovation; we draw a parallel between these notions 
and the notion of option. An invention is the discovery of an opportunity, what Bowman 
and Hurry described as a shadow option. An innovation is a transformed invention, 
originated in an opportunity, into an exploitable and hopefully profitable option. When 
the opportunity becomes exploitable the firm possesses a real option. The 
transformation of the invention into a profitable innovation depends on whether the firm 
has the appropriate resources at the right moment. 
Once the shadow option is taken into account (area d Figure 1) the rest of the option 
chain can be considered in the same way as described above. When the shadow option 
is recognized, it moves from shadow option label to real option. The option has then to 
be evaluated, compared to the other options, and also take account of probable 
interactions between them in the portfolio of option decisions of the firm. 
The addition made by Bowman and Hurry does not completely answer the question of 
the origin of the real option, it merely shifts the debate. Instead of explaining the origin 
of the real option, the genesis of the shadow option must be elucidated. 
 
2.3 Strategic management debates 
Before introducing the entrepreneur / manager we add to Figure 1 the outcomes of a 
recent debate in the strategic management literature about real option that highlights 
other problems in that option chain. This debate focuses on the link between the 
different steps of the option chain, we refer to them by the letters A, B, and C. These 
three cases are explored below. 
 
The debate starts at A, based on  works by Adner and Levinthal (2004). They observe 
the growing interest in real option while noticing that the terminology of real option is 
very trendy but encompasses different realities, including works which talk about real 
option when they should not. In their work these authors describe what is not a real 
option, and show the characteristics of a real option. They show that a real option is not 
something that the firm possesses for free, but only in paying a premium (but the 
payment can be not deliberate). This characteristic acts at the determination of the real 
option, so it is natural to place this debate between the shadow and the real option.  
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Kogut and Kulatilaka discuss the difficulties of translating concepts from one domain 
into another. In this case, from the financial world to strategic management. This 
translation can be particularly misleading if one does not take into account the 
specificities of each domain and performs too radical translation. They also consider the 
qualification and applicability of the option logic according the ability that a firm has to 
influence the option. This is a fundamental difference from the financial option, where 
the firm’s action does not change the value of the underlying asset traded on financial 
markets.  
 
The mark B on Figure 1 refers to two organizational forces which act to undermine the 
real option approach in strategic decision making. 
 
(i)-The fundamental distinction between an option and a standard evaluation technique 
comes from the non-symmetric payoffs of the option. The models of real option define 
the investment only if positive outcomes emerge (the good state of the world), avoid 
negative outcomes by stopping investment in bad states of the world. Stopping 
investment is a key to limiting downside risk. Adner and Levinthal (2004) highlight the 
importance of abandonment when maintaining options alive requires active investment 
and involvement in individuals and capital to maintain the capabilities of the firm and to 
exploit the option if it becomes profitable. They notice that the firm can change her 
capabilities (with time and money), she can also theoretically change the condition of 
use of the option, and so manipulate the outcome of that option. In that case, an option 
can be made profitable. If the firm decides to act this way, the involvement of the firm 
may be costly and lead to bankruptcy, because the firm is always a step closer to 
making the option interesting to exercise, without reaching this exercise point. This 
means that the firm needs to have a clear agenda of action to undertake and follow it 
when time has come to abandon an option definitively. If this abandonment schedule is 
not followed the firm avoids the downside risk of the real option but suffers a large 
downside risk of the shadow option.  
 
(ii)-These authors also notice that the value of the option comes from the uncertainty of 
the outcome. Thus, the higher the uncertainty, the broader the set of possible outcomes. 
On the contrary when the uncertainty is not resolved another trap for decision makers 
appears. If uncertainty is stable or increases, the variety of choices of the firm increases.  
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Exploring this broader space of uncertainty has an impact. The exploration of this 
variety increases the possibilities of choice, creating “options on options”, instead of 
reducing uncertainty. Thus, the more the firms invest in her real option portfolio, the 
more the size (number of options) and value of the portfolio increase, but the less the 
firm is able to exercise a significant part of her option. In that case the firm never comes 
to exercise because the more she searches, the more the option value, and the potential 
value of her investment if exercised increase.  
This leads to some kind of hysteria, where the firm increases her capabilities without 
building the capacities for production and lacks the possibility to enter the exploitation 
phases (Kogut and Kulatilaka (2001)). 
 
The mark C on Figure 1 refers to the exploitation of the real option an the conception of 
further development phases. 
Kogut and Kulatilaka give a numerical example of status quo biases. They discuss the 
fact that new options, will bring a change in the organizational structure of the firm. 
And the individuals will see their positions in the organization chart modified. They can 
be reluctant to accept these modifications and slow down the appropriate schedule of 
application. Numerical simulation shows that missing the optimal timing will 
significantly decrease the value of the option, and so eliminate the potential gains 
coming from its introduction. 
 
McGrath (1999) provides an analysis of the bias that can affect decisions at this stage. 
In particular if one or several of the previous steps have not been a complete success. 
Some of the biases modify the smoothness of the option chain during the different steps. 
These errors and biases can leave marks on the firm and the decision-makers. 
At the end of the represented option chain, the firm can enter another chain, depending 
on the resources available. The biases can lead to overreaction and seriously alter the 
value of the future shadow and real option. In the case of success in the production 
phase, the firm has a strong incentive to explore the future in the same way acted before. 
This can be a poor guide for action since the routines that proved effective in 
exploitation are probably not the most appropriate for the creation of new opportunities. 
They make an imitation of creativity and are without any surprise. 
Moreover, because the routine is a success, it is difficult for a management to abandon 
it. Resting too long on existing routines reduces the dynamic capabilities of the firm and  
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her ability to build new resources and obtain rents. Moreover, because the routine is a 
success, it is difficult for a management to abandon it. Resting too long on existing 
routines reduces the dynamic capabilities of the firm and her ability to build new 
resources and obtain rents. 
In Table 2 we list some real option categories. Many of them are dependent of market 
conditions. If market conditions are more favourable than expected the firm can expand 
the scale of production or accelerate resource utilisation. Conversely if conditions are 
less favourable than expected, the scale of operation can be reduced. The adaptation of 
the production to the quantity of product demanded is part of the option logic. This 
logic contains also the option to adapt the production gradually to the market condition, 
including qualitative adaptation, skills and routines adaptation through staged option. 
The speed of executing routines, of changing their contents and of switching between 
them is analysed by Cohen (1991). For this author the foundation of dynamic 
capabilities are the skills and routines of the individual members. The building, 
modifying and refinement of that repertoire of routines constitute much of the 
performance that can be found in learning curve research. If a firm, for market reasons 
or manager entrenchment reasons, decides not to change the production, the ability of 
the firm to adapt or change her routines will vanish and so will her dynamic capabilities 
and option creation capacities. The stability of the environment, the stickiness of habits, 
is unfavourable to the development of the needed entrepreneurial spirit. Hoverer this 
debate does not alter her short term profitability which can be strongly increases by 
resting on exiting routines. 
 
Many psychological phenomena, or cognitive biases can alter the development of future 
options, for example the confirmation bias. During the decision phase, individuals may 
see information with negative connotations as less plausible, on the other hand promptly 
take into account information with positive connotations. This leads the numerical part 
of the evaluation to be false (costs, revenues, opportunities, profits). Another bias is the 
overconfidence bias, when individuals attribute success to one's own actions and failure 
to bad luck (Barney (1986)). Let us take the example of a “technology guru”, whose 
advise influences the market. If firms, or investors, follow his advice, they invest 
massively in an option that has probably no value. Entrants see new markets as 
profitable, full of growth option and so enter the market. If other firms make the same 
observation their mutual entrances lead to a reduction of the profit.  
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The mirror effect of this bias is to assimilate everything that leaded once to a failure to a 
negative path that must not be followed again. This eliminate all attempts to build 
similar new shadow options in the future. 
 
All those biases do not mean that one should reconsider the advantage of using real 
option in comparison to other techniques. The option represents the flexibility inherent 
to the project. Using techniques without representation of the flexibility clearly misleads 
the judgement of the decision makers, and following our discussion, does not imply that 
the managers take a better timing, relying on one or the other technique. Why should 
decisions following the prescription of simpler techniques not been marred by errors? 
 
The reminding important point on the origin of the shadow option, our addition to this 
chain, is represented in the area 3 on Figure 1.  
 
3  Introduction of the entrepreneurial resource 
 
A historical approach of entrepreneurs in the microeconomic theory shows that when 
authors need to introduce novelties or special variations into a theory of the firm they 
often refer to the figure of the entrepreneur (Barreto (1989)). In this work we consider 
entrepreneurship as a resource of the firm and an opportunity exploiter (Cohendet et al. 
(2000)). The characteristics given to entrepreneurs are widely influenced in economics 
by the work of Schumpeter and Kirzner (1979). Kirzner introduced the concept of 
“entrepreneurial alertness” as the special ability of the entrepreneur to see where 
products (or services) do not exist and can be profitably exploited. Alertness exists 
when one individual has an insight into the value of a given resource while others do 
not. From this perspective, entrepreneurial alertness refers to “flashes of superior 
insight” that enable one to recognize an opportunity when it presents itself.  
 
As mentioned the starting point of the shadow option is the identification of an 
opportunity. This identification is often a vision resulting from the imagination of the 
entrepreneur of what could be an opportunity. This imagination, as described by Witt 
(1998), leads to action. The identification of a shadow option consists of the 
entrepreneur’s representation of the world. The entrepreneur acts in accordance with 
his/her newly created state of the world. As a consequence, the entrepreneurial resource  
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will begin to dispatch information about his/her findings. After that discovery begins the 
search for resources and the creation of knowledge for transforming this shadow option 
into a real option. The search process that follows is widely influenced by the vision of 
the entrepreneurial resource.  
 
3.1 Entrepreneurs, options and heuristics 
The entrepreneur’s representation of the world and behaviour for searching how to 
move from the shadow to a real option is a special kind of heuristics. Kogut and 
Kulatilaka (2001) give an insightful approach of real option, capabilities and heuristics. 
The authors split heuristics into two parts, a cognitive frame and rules of search. A 
cognitive (or heuristic) frame refers to the representation of the problem and the 
expected solution space. The heuristic rules of search are the algorithms by which 
solutions are found in the represented solution space. These authors identify four 
qualities of a good heuristics: it is easy to use, easy to communicate, it provides a better 
direction than the ones currently employed, and it motivates people who have to 
implement the strategy. The well-known matrix for portfolio analysis of the Boston 
Consulting Group is a perfect example of a heuristics. The vision span in this matrix is a 
child’s play, the pictures of cow, dog, star and question mark are understood and 
remembered by everybody, from a first year management student to the executive 
(Macmillan and Tampoe (2001)). The BCG matrix example is only one part of a 
heuristics, it represents the cognitive frame. Nelson and Winter (1982) used the notion 
of routines, which is organizational enactment of heuristic problem solving for 
representing the second part of a heuristics, the rules of search. 
 
The definition of vision and imagination that we developed previously implies a special 
cognitive frame. For Busenitz and Barney (1997) entrepreneurs use heuristics more 
extensively than managers in larger organizations. In using heuristics they make 
simplifications that allow the development of ideas, enable them to continue without 
answering all possible problems that may arise. Especially in complex situations where 
less complete or uncertain information is available such behaviours ease the evolution 
of the organization. The differences in the use of heuristics between entrepreneurial and 
managerial firms reside in the fact that entrepreneurial ones are more responsive to 
opportunities. The differences in their appraisal of the future suggest a difference in the 
option identification. Also the heuristic-based logic enables entrepreneurs to make sense  
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of uncertain and complex situations more quickly than hierarchic management. Gavetti 
and Levinthal (2000) pinpoint that decision making in such a context is forward 
looking, as opposed to backward looking procedures that develop no options but focus 
on resources already in use.
  
 
3.2 Combining resources, the emergence of the real option 
Once the opportunity is identified one can notice that the entrepreneur certainly does not 
have the specific knowledge and expertise in all domains necessary to fulfil his goal. 
This lets him in charge of finding and combining the adequate resources for his 
endeavour. The acquisition of a new productive capability by building a new 
competence is not instantaneous. The building process is mainly path dependent and 
involves tacit knowledge acquired by learning by doing and experimentation. This 
implies that firms who create knowledge are also option-creating firms. By creating new 
knowledge these firms expand their cognitive frames, part of the real option heuristics. 
The value of the entrepreneurial resource appears here as having the ability to combine 
different expert knowledge in way to exploit opportunities. The individual we call 
entrepreneur is not necessarily outside of the firm, he is more likely a member of the 
firm becoming a intrapreneur. Neither is there a necessity that this is done by a sole 
individual, a group of individual, termed diffused entrepreneurship could perform this 
action. As the diffusion of the entrepreneur mind becomes broader, we move from a 
Schumpeter Mark I to a Schumpeter Mark II framework. 
 
3.3 Creation of new capabilities and productive knowledge 
Once the entrepreneurial resource obtains commitment for searching resources and 
creating new knowledge the shaping of the real option begins. The search for 
appropriate resources can be carried out inside or outside the firm. An intuitive solution 
for the search for new resources is to rely on communities. Communities, according to 
the knowledge-based theory of the firm, are the intangible places where knowledge is 
shared and created. Each community has its own specificities, concerning the modes of 
learning, the type of knowledge created, autonomy, and hierarchical architecture. The 
organizational and knowledge environment of communities has thus important 
consequences for our understanding of how co-ordination, motivation and sharing of 
visions work, and how they structure the firm’s enabling options. The nature of the 
activities concerned (production, research development, finance, etc.), the goals and  
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motivations of the potential users and developers of the innovative idea contribute to the 
speed, the inflexibilities, and the different dimensions of the emerging routines used to 
give consistency to the emerging real option. Two major types of communities are 
usually presented in the literature, communities of practice and epistemic communities. 
The key point to distinguish them is that epistemic communities are truly oriented 
toward new knowledge creation, whereas communities of practice are oriented toward 
the achievement of the activity (Cohendet and Llerena (2003)). 
 
Creating the underlying knowledge necessary to transform a shadow option into a real 
option is a task corresponding to the attributes of an epistemic community. Using the 
real option and enhancing the practical implementation of a productive process are tasks 
corresponding to a community of practice. Thus, the passage from a shadow to a real 
option corresponds to the transformation of the epistemic community into a community 
of practice. The type of management has also to change from an entrepreneur to a 
manager. Nooteboom (2000), building on a different representation of exploitation and 
exploration, than the shadow and real option concept we use, comes to the same 
utilisation timing between entrepreneur and manager.  
 
The point of view we take in the major part of this work is that a firm must invest in 
knowledge assets. Unlike physical or financial assets, knowledge can be transferred 
throughout the firm and applied to various projects and processes. That is the essence of 
a core competence as the basis for strategy. The options logic seems particularly 
compelling for evaluating such knowledge assets. If a knowledge asset created by an 
option combines with existing knowledge, the firm may be more likely to exercise the 
option than if the asset were isolated. This is because the value of the knowledge is 
contingent on its transfer, combination  and recombination with other knowledge-based 
assets in a firm.  
 
Another point of view would be that, when establishing an option on knowledge assets, 
the firm may have the choice of combining new assets initially or keeping them 
isolated. In some cases, an incompatible culture, routine, or technology must be kept 
isolated from other assets in order to thrive. Isolation also serves to limit the 
development of social networks that may lead to the escalation of commitment 
(Andrikopoulos (2005); Coff and Laverty (2001)). The importance of knowledge asset  
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in the strategic approach of real options is unquestionable. Nonetheless the influence of 
the individuals responsible for the management of this specific asset is not to be 
overlooked. These individuals include the entrepreneur and manager whose roles have 
been discussed previously, but also the communities. 
 
3.4 From entrepreneur to manager  
A recurrent if not fundamental problem in real option valuation is the definition of the 
value of the option. The determination of the value of the option is a critical aspect 
because it determines whether the option is used or not, and if it is when it is 
appropriate to use it. Troubles arise when trying to identify numbers for the different 
variables used in real option formulas, as Luehrman (1998) suggests, practitioners often 
have to “take an educated guess”.  
 
The decision to exercise the option and to turn to a production phase correspond to a 
managerial decision making process. A reason why the manager does not enter the 
option chain earlier comes from the nature of the output of the shadow option. The 
output of the knowledge building process (what is done during the shadow option) is 
difficult to evaluate, the knowledge is disperse and the manager is not aware of all 
pieces before the entrepreneur ends his action. The managerial decision depends on the 
balance between entering the market with the actual resources and knowledge or 
waiting for absorbing more capacities. As shown by Lane et al. (1998) managerial 
capabilities are developed by training, repetition in decision-making, rules of thumb 
implementation and day-to-day management. This approach of managerial decision is in 
fact the situation mostly described by real option valuation problems (area 1 Figure 1), 
where basic managerial economic inputs such as cost or existing demand (including 
some standard deviation) are used. This data are made by entrepreneurial action for 
convincing of the accuracy of their first vision. If manager take this data into account 
the entrepreneurial part of the option chain is a success. At this point we catch up with 
existing literature of real option concerned with evaluation based on some informative 
inputs. This leads us to give a description of value determination of the option based on 
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4. Evaluation along the Option Chain 
 
In the following we present an original approach for assessing the value of the real 
option based on the difference between shadow and real option. We do not pretend to 
give a unique and exact value, rather an interval where the “real” real option value 
should be. 
 
We determine boundaries for four variables that intervene in the real option analysis, 
namely: the premium that is endured to acquire the option, the striking price for 
exercising the option, the gain if the option is exercised and the value of the option. 
Two parameters usually found in real option are omitted, the interest rate (assumed 
constant) and the time to expiration. The variables are discussed for both types of 
option, shadow and real. Of course it is difficult to assign costs directly to an inventive 
activity as needed by the formulas in particular for the shadow option. Also these costs 
can be incurred by the firm without obtaining an option. On the contrary the costs 
supported by the firm can serve to generate more than one shadow option. These costs 
can be taken in two different ways. If the firm deliberately tries to create a favourable 
environment for inventive ideas the costs are accountable and justifiable. If the firm 
does not support these costs deliberately the occurrence of the shadow option is just a 
non-intended event that the inefficient organisation produces by chance. The following 
discussion is summarised in Table 3.  
------------------------------ 
Insert Table 3 about here 
------------------------------ 
4.1 The shadow option 
•  The premium of the shadow option includes the cost supported by the firm for being 
aware of the existence of an opportunity. At the individual level it includes the cost 
of the entrepreneurial resources which launch the process expressed in wages and 
training cost of the employee without a direct link to the actual production. At the 
organization level it necessitates some weak ties between the task of an individual 
and his productive behaviour. The creation of an option should here be linked to 
organizational slack. For March (1979) organizational slacks are the spare resources 
and unexploited opportunities that act as a buffer against bad times. These 
unexploited opportunities and spare resources come from the fact that the firm does  
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not always optimise. The slack smoothes the performances of the firm, reducing 
performance during good times and improving it during bad times. Organizational 
slack costs are the costs of the resources that a firm acquires and that are not 
committed to a direct use or/and necessary expenditure (see Bourgeois (1981) for an 
interesting discussion of how to measure slack). Of course the kind of inventive idea 
arising from an employee such as a manager or  a product line agent creates a 
different type of option at different costs, e.g. product innovation, process 
innovation… 
 
•  The exercise price of the shadow option includes the costs that are necessary to 
transform the shadow option into a real option. They are costs of negotiation (in 
time) that the entrepreneur spends explaining the idea and convincing the decision 
makers in the firm to spend financial resources on the competence building process. 
If the firm decides to build the competences (after eventually some market analysis 
costs) the costs come from the activity of search and combination of different types 
of resources in such a way as to produce new knowledge needed to practically 
implement the inventive idea. Good proxies for such costs are R&D expenses or 
start-up creation outlays (in the sense that start-ups are legally different entities 
created to try to transform an idea into something profitable). 
 
•  If the shadow option is exercised the gain depends on the best use of the new 
combination of resources the firm has realised. The best use determines the highest 
gain the firm can obtain by combining resources, through internal use of the 
resources or by selling them on a market. The combination can have a value of zero 
if no productive use following the investment can occur, or on the contrary the 
uniqueness of the combination can be highly valuable if the opportunity it 
contributes to seize is considerable. 
 
•  The value of the shadow option is generally divided in two parts, the intrinsic value 
and the speculative value. In the case of a shadow option the value is at least the 
gain of selling the resources built on the market price (which can be zero) and a 
maximum value incorporating all future strategic options that can be built on the 
basis of these resources. In this analysis the boundaries of the shadow option are 
zero and infinite. This approximation is of course not of great help for someone who  
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tries to identify the exact value of the firm’s option. But we have to notice that this 
value is in constant variation. So this framework shows clearly that real options are 
only useful as a tool if decision makers agree to monitor them often and to specify 
boundaries of acceptance in advance (e.g. rules of thumb) and to stick to these 
boundaries. Also the value of the shadow option is mainly influenced by its 
speculative value. Many over-optimistic analyses that are performed confuse the 
value of the shadow option with the value of the real option they try to evaluate. For 
us the value of the shadow option is only a transition point to guide an effective real 
option evaluation. 
 
4.2 The real option 
•  The premium of the real option depends on the previous initiatives of the firm, 
whether the firm has already invested in the shadow option or not. If the state of the 
firm follows the exercise of the shadow option then the sum of the exercise price 
and the premium of the shadow option forms the premium of the real option. If the 
firm has not previously invested in the shadow option the costs are at least 
equivalent to the gain of the shadow option. This mean that the firms who want a 
certain bundle of competences have the choice between building these resources 
within the firm, which can be extremely time consuming, or buying them on the 
market which can be expensive. The interest of many firms for a rare resource 
increases the price on the market. Langlois (1992) gave an example of cost that 
influences the ranking of activities (and competences) a firm can acquire. If the 
shadow option costs are supported, the ranking of the profitable activities a firm can 
expect to enter into is different from the ranking of a firm that has not incurred these 
costs. 
 
•  The cost of exercising the real option. Now that the firm is assumed to possess the 
necessary competences to exploit an opportunity, e.g. to enter the productive stage, 
she has to hire employees, build a productive plant etc…The firm can also switch 
employees from an existing production plant to another, abandoning an older 
product for launching a new one (as depicted in the BCG matrix). These costs are 
usually the only ones taken into account in standard real option evaluation. 
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•  The remaining two points, gain when the option is exercised and value of the real 
option, are consistent with the definition widely found in corporate finance books. 
The gain obtained when the real option is exercised is the present value of the cash 
flow generated by the option and the value of the real option is given by adequate 
formulas depending on the market structure, the demand of the consumer’s 





The aim of this article was to show the translation of the option concept from the 
financial to the strategic management field. We see that, in addition to the financial 
characteristics needed to obtain an option value, the management perspective needs to 
specify the roles of individuals. We use the concept introduced by Bowman/ Hurry 
(1993) of shadow option and option chain in our presentation that we enhance with 
entrepreneurship. We suggest that entrepreneurship in a new firm, or an existing one, is 
at the origin of real option.  
As we have shown a firm with an entrepreneurial heuristics will give a different value to 
resources and to options than other firms (see Table 3 for some examples). The value of 
the competence is a capital part of the real option value, and conversely future option 
determines partly the competence value. 
In theoretical approaches, real option shows a greater effectiveness than standard 
evaluation techniques. However, one can be puzzled to see how few firms use real 
option. This can be explained by several facts, first the mathematical background 
needed to use option techniques can be too demanding. Secondly, in addition to the 
biases listed in this paper, a manager can encounter problems to represent option 
cognitively. Miller and Shapira (2004) explore this point with a study on option 
evaluation on a sample of finance trained students and practitioners. They notice that the 
options are systematically misevaluated, especially because people take into account 
facts that have in reality no impact on the option value. Howell and Jägle (1997) in a 
study over five different industries note that the values attributed to options are 
systemically over or under evaluated depending on the industrial sector of the 
interviewed manager.  
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We proposed in that work an explication of the difficulty to use the real option theory in 
practice. Not only are the whole costs that should be taken into account in option 
evaluation difficult –if  not impossible– to account for (the cost of shadow and real 
option), but also the creation and utilisation of this option needs the intervention of 
different individuals (entrepreneurs and managers) who have different points of view 
and different value representations. This can lead a firm, not to consider options that 
might result in a profitable exploitation of an opportunity. 
Future developments of real option should increase the integration in the real option 
theory  with behavioural finance and the theory of the firm considerations. This would 
be a way to obtain a strategic theory of the firm explaining the difficult tasks of 
capabilities building and capacities exploitation. 
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Table 1. Correspondence between financial and real options  
Variable  Financial Option  Real Option – Project 
K  Exercise Price  Cost to acquire the asset 
S  Stock Price  Present value of the future cash flows 
from the asset 
T  Time to expiration  Length of time the option is viable 
σ²  Variance of the stock returns  Riskiness of the asset, variance of the 
best and worst case scenario 





Table 2. Variety of real option and corresponding flexibility  
Type of real option  Expression of the flexibility 
The  option  to  defer  The option to defer, or to wait, derives its value form 
reducing uncertainty granted by the ability to wait until 
more information has arrived 
The option to abandon  The possibility to shut down an unprofitable project 
The option to switch  The flexibility to change the nature of the input or output, 
or modus operandi (to employ substitutes) 
The option to contract 
/expand 
The capability of altering the capacity depending on 
market conditions (low/high demand, intensity of 
competition) 
The option to growth  To  create  infrastructure and opportunities for future 
expansion 
The option to stage/ 
compound option 
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Table  3: Cost and Value of the Shadow and Real Options 
 
  Shadow option (SO)  Real option (RO) 
Premium (P)  PSO  
-The cost of the entrepreneurial 
resource that launches the process. 
-Organizational Slack 
-Cost of additional training, 
without a direct link to 
productivity. 
PRO  
-If follows the exercise of the 
shadow option, the exercise price 
and the premium of the shadow 
option (PSO + KSO). 
-If the firm does not have the 
previous shadow option, at least S, 
given through dynamic transaction 
costs. 
Exercise price (K) 
 
KSO 
-Cost of convincing decision maker 
to spend financial resources to 
search and tie raw resources. 
- Cost of monitoring the employee.  
KRO  
Cost to acquire the necessary 
assets to enter production (plant, 
workers…) 
Gain if exercise (S) 
 
SSO  
The value of best use of the new 
combination of resources. 
SRO 
Present value of future cash flows 
generated. 
Value of the option 
(V) 
VSO  
The value of the shadow option is 
greater than the gain S because it 
incorporates the strategic 
possibilities of the future. 
VRO.  
As calculated by traditional real 
option evaluation models 
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